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Abstract 
 
For over two centuries, some of China’s most prominent officials, literary figures, and 
intellectuals have paid special attention to the legacy of Shi Lang. Compared to many other 
historical figures, in East Asia’s cross-strait tensions and geopolitics, Shi Lang remains essential 
to our understanding of this region’s troubled past and the murky outlook for its future. Although 
the image of Shi Lang continues to mean different things to different people, to some degree, his 
significance to one particular community is also communicated to other communities. As a 
result, by analysing most of the previous appraisals and examinations of Shi Lang, we can see 
the historical narratives of this man as being continually under construction in a shifting and 
mutually reinforcing process. This paper aims to examine the ways in which the legacy of Shi 
Lang has percolated throughout Chinese history, since the Qing Dynasty, and also how it 
continues to function in the present day. It is fascinating to not only delineate how the story of 
Shi Lang has evolved as a legacy, but also to explore the rich variety of ways in which an 
individual or a community has adapted the narratives that makes up the story of Shi Lang to suit 
the demands of different historical settings and perspectives. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1683, the Qing (1644-1912), with its formidable fleets and advanced cannons, 
decimated the Zheng’s maritime apparatus. The Manchu then took possession of Taiwan Island. 
Shi Lang (1621-1696), the native Fujian commander-in-chief of the Qing navy, led this military 
offensive. Ironically, the commander had originally served the Zheng camp and was once 
considered a valuable member of the Zheng family. Yet, by the mid-1600s, he had turned his 
back on his former allegiances and sided with the Manchu. 
 
 
Shi Lang’s relationship with the Zhengs was intriguing and complex. This is especially so 
of his relationships with Zheng Zhilong (1604-1661) and Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662, whom 
Westerners known as Koxinga), the two respective headsmen of the Zheng’s maritime enterprise. 
Zheng Zhilong was the founder of the Zheng force and the first leader to recognize Shi Lang’s 
proficiency in naval warfare. In 1640, he appointed Shi Lang as captain of the navy’s left 
vanguard, gradually promoting him to ever-higher ranks. However, in 1646, quite startlingly, 
 2 
Zheng Zhilong began to consider the possibility of defecting to the Manchu, and this had a 
profound impact on Shi Lang’s career. Knowing that some Ming generals, who had gone over to 
the Qing, were being treated favourably, Zhilong decided to withdraw his resistance against the 
Manchus. This left the Zhejiang passes unguarded and allowed the conquerors to capture 
Fuzhou.
1
 As a result of this Manchu victory, Zheng Zhilong was substantially rewarded. Yet the 
leader failed to persuade all of his followers to serve the Qing,
 2
 most notably his son, Zheng 
Chenggong, and his right-hand man, Shi Lang. 
 
 
With Zheng Zhilong no longer opposing the Manchu, Zheng Chenggong became the 
legitimate successor of the maritime empire, and Shi Lang continued to be a reliable subordinate. 
However, whereas Shi Lang was once Koxinga’s sworn brother, he failed to maintain a 
harmonious relationship with his new leader. Koxinga had always been jealous of the bond of 
trust that existed between Shi Lang and his father.
3
 Added to this were the many occasions 
during which Shi Lang offended Koxinga, both publicly and privately.
4
 The most intense conflict 
between the two men occurred after Koxinga’s military loss at Xiamen. Shi Lang had accurately 
predicted Xiamen’s vulnerability and, therefore, grew increasingly arrogant and often openly 
questioned Koxinga’s military tactics.5 In late 1651, no longer able to bear Shi Lang’s arrogance 
and temperament, Koxinga imprisoned him, on a boat, along with his father and younger brother. 
But two sympathetic followers helped Shi Lang escape to the Qing, where he surrendered to the 
Manchu. Meanwhile, back in Taiwan, Koxinga showed no mercy to Shi’s family. In a single 
night, he executed Shi Lang’s father, brother, son, and nephew. Shi Lang considered this bloody 
retaliation to be unforgiveable and vowed to never re-join the Zheng camp. Instead, he 
committed himself to serving the Manchu and seeking revenge for the death of his family.
6
 
 
 
During his first decade of service, the Qing court valued Shi Lang for his extensive naval 
experience and his network of commercial contacts in East Asia. Shi swiftly attained the rank of 
assistant brigadier-general. In 1668, Shi proposed a plan to eliminate the Zhengs by invading 
Taiwan and the Pescadores.
7
 Yet, at that time, the Qing was mired in the Three Feudatories 
Revolt (1673-1681), which prevented the country from launching another campaign at sea. It 
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was not until 1681 that the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661-1722) finally approved Shi’s plan and 
tasked him with organizing and training the navy. The obvious objective was to declare war on 
Taiwan.
8
 In July 1683, Shi Lang led a fleet of 300 vessels, mainly crewed by Fujian soldiers, to a 
great naval victory in the Pescadores. The following October, he proceeded to Taipei and forced 
Zheng Keshuang (1670-1707), the grandson of Koxinga and the last ruler of the Zheng force, to 
capitulate.
9
 For his success in this campaign, Shi Lang was bestowed the title of marquis (jinghai 
hou), an honour that was passed down to his ancestors, in perpetuity (shixi wangti).
10
 
 
 
This is a brief account of one of the Qing’s most remarkable admirals and officials. 
However, the aim of this article is not to unpack the eventful life of this notable figure — from 
his shifting loyalties to his bitter antagonism toward the Zheng’s camp. What follows does not 
even provide an outline of how Shi Lang defeated the Zheng fleet in the Taiwan Strait and the 
Pescadores— a textbook case of a significant achievement in the Great Qing, in both diplomacy 
and military effectiveness and prowess as it meant conquering Taiwan. Nor does this article say 
much about the way Shi Lang administrated the island of Taiwan after it was annexed by the 
Qing. Scholars and historians of the rapidly growing field of maritime Asian studies have 
conducted substantial research on the life and times of Shi Lang; and they continue to uncover 
new information and make it available to Chinese and Anglophone audiences.
11
 This article 
differs from these other promising works of scholarship. Here, we are about to explore the 
evolving legacy of Shi Lang through the production and (re)interpretation of history, in China 
and Taiwan, since the late seventeenth century. 
 
 
Representations of Shi Lang, in China and Taiwan, as seen in private writings, 
commentaries, scholarly articles, books, comics, film, television, and other media, have wildly 
diverged, especially over the last decade. Commentaries on the Qing, produced in China, present 
Shi Lang as a promising admiral who helped consolidate and expand Qing rule. Yet, his legacy 
did not receive much attention during the Republican period and the first few decades of the 
Peoples’ Republic. It was not until the 1980s that Shi Lang became viewed as a maritime hero 
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(haishang yingxiong) for his momentous victory over the Zheng force, a reputation that has 
endured to this day. From the 1980s on, discussions of Shi have periodically emerged in PRC 
productions that use him and his story as a vehicle with which to disseminate a variety of 
political messages. In Taiwan, by contrast, Shi’s legacy continues to be disputed. There, for 
some time, he has been casted as neither a superb general nor a national hero, but rather as a 
defector to the Ming and, later, as an autocratic governor of Taiwan. It was only in the 1990s that 
historians and the general public began to re-evaluate his significance. Accordingly, I will argue 
that these divergent discourses reflect the influence of, if not the subjugation to, the official 
agendas and political aspirations of scholars of the field, and that these have persisted throughout 
the twentieth century. For over a hundred years, the story of Shi Lang has conformed to the 
official line of the Qing, the Nationalists and, later, the communist authorities. In other words, 
the story itself has provided a kind of operational resource that respective governments have used 
in order to (de)construct history so as to achieve their political goals. The diverse dichotomizing 
approaches toward Shi Lang suggest that when leaders on one side appropriate an historical 
narrative, those on the other side will find it necessary to reject that interpretation in order to 
avoid embracing the political and cultural meanings that are associated with the contested party. 
 
 
Nonetheless, these government indoctrinations did not always maintain the upper hand. 
These centralized master narratives were also tangled up in local and regional politics, 
particularly in the Minnan region. This means that, on many occasions, the reception of the 
official narratives was, complicated and contingent upon the local conditions within Minnan, 
which did not precisely fit within the “central direction (zhongyang luxian)” of the discourse. 
Accordingly, this paper will also focus on the state’s relationship with this (dis)connected 
Minnan articulation. We will look at three patterns of Minnan’s distinctive cultural development, 
during its long history, from the Qing to the present day. We will also proceed by comparing the 
commentaries on the official narratives of Shi Lang and the local interpretations of this historical 
figure and how they interact with each other. 
 
 
As we shall see, within the Minnan region not only do intellectuals challenge the official 
narrative by disputing certain presentations of this historical figure, but also ordinary citizens 
arrive at their own significant interpretations that are based on their need to see Shi Lang from 
their own cultural or localized point of view. And these are often in opposition to the official 
version put forth by the state. Because of this continual oscillation between different perspectives 
and actions, we will come up with a picture that moves between levels that are usually either 
conflated or framed within the settings of separate states, spaces, generations, and practices. In a 
nutshell, in this article we will complicate the ways in which the legacy of Shi Lang functioned 
as it percolated throughout Chinese history. I am interested not only in delineating how the story 
has evolved as a legacy, but also in exploring the rich variety of ways in which an individual or a 
community has adapted the contents of Shi Lang’s story to suit the demands of various historical 
situations. As Paul Cohen cogently argues in his Speaking to History: The Story of King Goujian 
in Twentieth-Century China, when a historical narrative is positioned in different historical 
settings, it carries different meanings.
12
 Thus the focus of this article is the relationship between 
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the historical narratives of Shi Lang and the circumstances under which people are compelled to 
attach special meaning to these narratives. 
 
 
Historical Figures and their Legacies 
  
 
The psychologist Jerome Burner, in Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life, has this to say about 
the connection between historical narratives and situations: “[W]e cling to narrative models of 
reality and use them to shape our everyday experiences. We say of people we know in real life 
that they are Micawbers or characters right out of a Thomas Wolfe novel.” In Burner’s 
understanding, such fictional stories and characters become “templates for experience.”13 He 
adds that the feature of these templates “is that they are so particular, so local, so unique – yet 
have such reach. They are metaphors writ large or root metaphors of the human condition.”14 
Although Burner developed this theoretical insight from a variety of examples taken from the 
West, the same can be said about the Chinese situation. In fact, almost all cultures have shared 
stories, legends, myths, and celebrated historical figures. Some historical figures are widely 
known throughout a culture, others are known primarily within particular subgroups of a culture, 
still others are familiar only to the educated or the upper class. 
 
 
Like the West, China has its own storehouse of well-known historical figures and 
culturally shared stories. But, as Paul Cohen points out, what distinguishes China from the West 
is the utmost importance for the “Chinese to communicate through stories and historical figures 
what they want their fellow Chinese to feel and think.”15 Arguably, the very reason for this is 
because, from ancient times, the Chinese had developed an ancillary set of justifications for the 
importance of conveying information through stories and historical figures. That is, as with Shi 
Lang, the Chinese view other characters as embodying particular meanings and functions in 
collective contexts throughout Chinese history. These characters include King Guojian (r. 
496BC-465BC), Guan Yu (160-219), Wen Tianxiang (1236-1283), Yue Fei (1103-1142), and 
Koxinga.
16
 Not only do historical characters bridge the past and the present, but their legacies 
also become powerful instruments with which the central authority can define a specific cultural 
meaning, either objectively or subjectively. In other words, central authorities can (re)interpret 
these historical figures so that they address these authorities’ present needs and also point to 
some future direction. These legacies, thereby, permit authorities to forge a form of symbolic 
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sharing that is essential both to a culture’s objective existence and to an individual’s subjective 
sense of belonging to that culture. As Mark Elvin puts it, “shared stories [of some historical 
figures] define the space,” while a particular human group operates “its conceptualized physical 
landscape.” 17  That being said, the functions historical figures perform would mainly be 
determined by the specific political and cultural milieu in which these figures are represented. 
 
 
Shi Lang in the Great Qing 
  
 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Qing officially viewed Shi Lang as a 
prominent general who consolidated Qing rule in South China. In a similar fashion, Shi was 
favourably assessed in unofficial accounts (yeshi) compiled by local writers and gentry scholars 
who were writing in the Confucian tradition. Most commentaries followed the Kangxi Emperor’s 
tone. In fact, shortly after the conquest of Taiwan, the emperor admitted that Shi Lang was “a 
brilliant admiral who knew the islands (including Taiwan) very well.”18  The emperor even 
disclosed the fact that he enjoyed discussing with Shi Lang “almost every strategy related to 
Taiwan.” He further noted, “Because of his remarkable achievement (in pacifying Taiwan), I will 
grant Shi Lang wealth and glory ever after.”19 
 
 
After Kangxi, the literati of Fujian, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang were the source of most of the 
unreserved praise for Shi Lang. For instance, in his Minhai jiyao, Xia Lin praised Shi’s military 
skill and courage.
20
 Zha Shenxing (1650-1727) and Chen Kangqi (1840-1890) concurred that Shi 
Lang achieved great success in elevating Qing rule to another level and in bringing peace to the 
sea off the Fujian coast (the Minhai).
21
 The prolific writer Ji Liuqi (1622-?) even dedicated a 
chapter in his Mingji nanlüe to Shi Lang. It was entitled, “The sea rebel captured and beheaded 
(qinzhan haizei).” In it, Ji Liuqi praised Shi’s gallantry and triumph over the Zhengs.22 These 
positive narratives converged over the course of the Qing: They lauded Shi as a significant 
contributor to Qing solidification (goji maozhu);
23
 and they noted that his accomplishment in 
conquering the Zhengs surpassed his image as a defector who defied the Confucian concepts of 
loyalty and piety when he forsook his allegiance to the Zheng camp. 
 
 
Despite these positive assessments of Shi Lang, it is worth noting that some of these 
literati, such as Xia Lin, also wrote sympathetic accounts of the Zheng family. But, to a large 
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extent, their writings on the Zheng were constrained by the Qing’s cultural dictatorship, which 
has been broadly referred to as a literary inquisition. The writings under this inquisition covered 
all topics, genres, and styles, from official governmental documents to personal essays. The Qing 
carried out a rigorous literary inquisition, together with measures to enforce an ideological 
orthodoxy that labelled the Zheng family as rebels and pirates who fought against the Great 
Qing. Under such strict censorship, few literati dared extend their appreciation, if any, toward the 
Zheng family. They could only express their sympathy and appreciation through subtle 
narratives. For example, when recording the death of Zheng Chenggong and the aftermath of his 
kingdom, Xia Lin described it as a “misfortune,” and when commenting on Zheng’s 
administrative style,
24
 Xu Zi, another historian on the Qing, assessed it as “impartial and above 
board (qiuqin jianyong, shangfa wusi).”25 
  
 
Additionally, most of these scholarly appraisals were written from an “outside-Taiwan” 
perspective, that is, by those who had neither visited nor lived in Taiwan. In contrast, some 
writers and officials who were more familiar with the island, or who may have visited/ lived 
there, adopted a different view of Shi Lang. They saw him as an incompetent, imperious minister 
who had caused a series of difficulties for the island. For instance, Huang Shujing (1682-1758), 
the first imperial high commissioner to Taiwan, condemned the “sea blockade policy” Shi Lang 
had implemented when he was the administrator of Taiwan. “Due to his unfavourable policy,” as 
Huang decried it, “the connections between Guangdong and Taiwan were severely damaged, 
thereby harming the economy of both sides and aggravating the problem of piracy along the 
Guangdong coast.”26 In Yu Yonghe’s (1645-?) Bihai jiyou, which is considered one of the most 
popular writings about Taiwan during the Qing, the author did not mention Shi Lang, not even in 
the chapter entitled, “Anecdote of the unendorsed Zhengs (wei Zheng yishi).”27 It is not entirely 
clear why Yu Yonghe did not include Shi Lang in his treatise. However, from these examples we 
are able to see that eighteenth-century assessments of Shi Lang were not always untainted. At 
some point, Shi was even seen as an amoral opportunist and a treacherous officer.
28
 Yet, we 
should not conclude that these negative assessments all came from a “local Taiwanese 
perspective,” since we would never identify Huang Shujing and Yu Yonghe as having been local 
Taiwanese subjects at the time. After all, as administrators of the island, they were representing 
the Qing court. 
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When Japan and France encroached on Taiwan, in the late nineteenth century,
29
 the Qing 
court continued to uphold the official notion that Shi Lang’s military capabilities were 
exemplary; the Qing wanted to remind not only these countries, but also the Chinese community, 
that Taiwan was an important part of the Qing Empire. For the Qing, the use of historical figures 
and precedents to justify its current policies and agendas constituted a significant mechanism of 
its governance. In grave and difficult times, authorities would promote the image of a particular 
figure and imbue it with the requisite positive spirit so as to inspire loyalty among officials and 
society. Thus, in official memoirs, such as Zhang wenxianggong zouyi, and local gazetteers, such 
as Guangxu Shuntian fuzhi, there are accounts of the Qing using the image of Shi Lang as the 
commander of the conquest of Taiwan so as to justify its annexation of the island.
30
 A number of 
scholars, likewise, echoed the Qing court in promoting the legacy of Shi Lang. For instance, the 
renowned writers Xu Ke (1869-1928) and Zheng Guangying (1842-1922) both underscored the 
crucial role Shi Lang played in Taiwan’s history and place within the Qing Empire. Both writers 
concur that Shi Lang was a gifted hero, who excelled in sea battles, and that he was also the key 
unifier who made possible the “Qing-Taiwan integration.”31 Jin Wuxiang, in his Suxiang suibi, 
was even more explicit: 
 
 
In the 22
nd
 year of Kangxi (1683), the emperor bestowed a poem on Shi Lang, parsing his 
remarkable victory in conquering Taiwan and extinguishing the rebels……In the preface 
of his poem, the emperor explained his reason for not giving up Taiwan. It is mainly 
because he was so worried about the deteriorating coastal economy and he could hardly 
bear to see his citizens, who used to live along the coast, suffer from the worsening 
situation. He, thus, appointed Shi Lang to lead the navy and pacify Taiwan without 
further delay. Thanks to Shi Lang and his faithful soldiers, the Zheng soon surrendered to 
the Qing. The emperor indicated, in the preface, that he still remembered that he received 
the report of victory during the mid-autumn festival. Convinced that his empire would 
have fewer hindrances after the Taiwan issue was settled, he cheered. He bestowed Shi 
Lang with the garment he was wearing on the day the news of victory arrived. In 
addition, the emperor also wrote Shi a poem expressing his highest appreciation.
32
 
 
 
Although a detailed summation of Jin Wuxiang’s recounting of the “Taiwan story” would be 
superfluous here, the connection between the emperor and Shi Lang is particularly noteworthy. 
In some respects, Jin idealizes Shi Lang even more than the earlier-discussed positive 
commentaries do. Jin does not give much attention to Shi’s military talents. Instead, he focuses 
on the aftermath of the conquest and highlights the emperor’s exceptional treatment of Shi Lang. 
In dynastic times, receiving a poem from an emperor was no doubt an honour and being 
bestowed with an emperor’s clothing would have been a supreme privilege. This treatment 
reinforces the sense that, at least for the Kangxi Emperor, Shi Lang had been indispensable in the 
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conquest of Taiwan. Jin’s account also reflects the notion that the imperial consensus of the early 
Kangxi era continued to influence some of the late-Qing narratives on Shi Lang. 
 
The Treaty of Shimonosaki, in 1895, ceded Taiwan to the Japanese. Prior to the arrival of 
the Japanese forces, Tang Jingsong (1841-1903), the Governor of Taiwan Province, had sought 
to establish a Republic of Formosa (Taiwan minzhuguo). But the Japanese swiftly supressed this 
initiative and it collapsed within five months. Shi Lang was nowhere to be found during this 
short-lived period of reformation. At the time, neither Tang Jingsong nor his followers 
recognized Shi’s importance. Instead, they celebrated the legacy of Zheng Chenggong 
(Koxinga), who had successfully defeated foreign invaders (the Dutch) in the seventeenth 
century and had used Taiwan as a base from which to resist a Manchu incursion. In a temple in 
Tainan, which was erected in commemoration of Zheng Chenggong, Tang Jingsong even 
dedicated a couplet to this “national hero,” which is emblazoned in the temple’s entrance, as 
follows: 
 
 
“From scholar to king, (Zheng Chenggong) is an exceptional model of all 
intellectuals in the world (you xiucai feng wang, wei tianxia dushuren biekai 
shengmian). 
 
Expelling foreigners from the country, (he) revitalizes and rejuvenates all aspirants 
in China (qu yizu chujing, yu Zhongguo youzhizhe zaigu xiongfeng).” 
 
 
By contrast, after the Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan, Shi Lang was omitted from the list of 
celebrated figures. And when Zheng Chenggong was being worshipped as a remarkable hero, 
Shi Lang failed to garner any positive appraisal because he was viewed as having defected from 
the Zheng to the Manchu. During the period of Japanese occupation (1895-1945), his legacy 
remained in almost total obscurity. The Japanese did not even mention Shi Lang in most of their 
official presses and newspapers, such as the Taiwan jiho and Taiwan nichinichi shipo. Perhaps 
this was because they were attempting to efface the Qing-Taiwan connection because it had 
taken place during a period of colonial control.
33
 And as Shi Lang was a Qing symbol that had 
united Taiwan and the mainland, he was also erased from Taiwanese narratives. However, 
despite the official “nihilistic” approach toward Shi Lang, his legacy was not completely 
removed from the histories that were written in colonial Taiwan by both Chinese and Taiwanese 
scholars – as we will discuss in further detail in subsequent sections. 
 
 
Shi Lang in the Republican and Early Communist Era 
  
 
In 1912, the Qing dynasty came to an end and was replaced by Republican China. In the 
aftermath of the Qing, however, China incurred one crisis after another – from Yuan Shikai’s 
(1859-1916) monarchy, to the May Fourth Movement, followed by years of warlordism, a civil 
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war between the Communists and the Nationalists, in the early thirties, the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, and the second civil war (1937-1949). Although there were progressive developments, 
during this period, the Republican era was one during which hope was persistently frustrated and 
nationalism became widespread. Also during this period, the notion of overthrowing everything 
Qing gained appeal. The Qing was China’s last dynasty, and it came to be seen as symbolizing 
the country’s backwardness, enfeeblement, and passiveness. As with other heroic Qing figures, 
such as Zheng Guofan (1811-1872), Zuo Zongtong (1812-1885), and Li Hongzang (1823-1907), 
Shi Lang did not receive the same attention he had been accorded in previous centuries.
34
 
Instead, the public revived its interest in Zheng Chenggong. This was especially so during the 
1920s and 1930s, which was a period of mounting Japanese aggression. Zheng Chenggong was 
acknowledged mainly because he had liberated Taiwan from the Dutch, in the seventeenth 
century, thereby convincingly illustrating that, at the time, the Chinese had been able to resist 
and even eradicate foreign control.
35
 Other figures from China’s past, such as Qi Jiguang (1528-
1588, who repelled Japanese wako pirates), Shi Kefa (1601-1645, who gave his life defending 
the Ming against the Manchus), and Yue Fei (the notable national hero of Southern Song), were 
also celebrated, in the Republican era, for their heroic resistance to invasions from foreign 
powers.
36
 Although Shi Lang had helped the Zheng fight off the Manchu before he joined the 
Qing, he was not included in the above group, most likely, because he had been overly idolised 
during the Qing. In essence, in the Republican period, he was seen as an unwelcome Qing figure 
and was not treated favourably. In the Draft History of [the] Qing (Qingshi gao), Zhao Erxun 
(1844-1927) portrayed Shi Lang as a “leading figure” who had pacified Taiwan, yet he only 
briefly mentioned Shi’s achievements.37 However, as Zhao was a Qing loyalist, it is possible that 
he might have purposely downplayed Shi, in his narrative, whereas, due to his scholarship, his 
assessments of Shi Lang and the Qing-Taiwan unification should have been extensively and 
objectively documented. Additionally, in the General History of Taiwan (Taiwan tongshi), Lian 
Heng (1878-1936) even depicted Shi Lang as a defector who had made a serious mistake: 
 
 
Formerly, he had been a subordinate of the Zheng kingdom; he defected to the Qing 
because he had offended the Zheng ruler. It is infuriating to think that he intended to 
overthrow the only pro-Ming resistance at that moment. I went to great pains to 
understand how he had put his personal feelings against the Zheng above larger national 
interests.
38
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Yet, it is worth noting that Lian Heng produced his Taiwan tongshi under a specific political 
climate. Therefore, his rationale and mentality were very different from those of scholars who 
had lived and written during the Qing (such as those scholars who were introduced in the 
previous section) or in Republican China (such as Zhao Erxun). Lian Heng was seventeen when 
the Qing was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). It was probably because of 
such a humiliating defeat that Lian Heng saw the Qing as a weak and declining country and one 
to which he did not establish a strong attachment. Later, during the colonial period, Heng was 
recruited as an editor of the official Tainan News Daily. Working as a journalist exposed him to 
the idea of nationalism, wherein he came to realize that the Taiwanese must have felt passionate 
about their indigenous heritage, language, and culture. Thus, Heng’s Taiwan tongshi was seen as 
a manifesto on the importance of a national Taiwanese identity. And as Shi Lang represented not 
only a Qing subject but also a defector from a Taiwan-based Zheng empire, it is understandable 
that he was abased. 
 
 
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, Shi’s legacy received more superficial treatment in the 
PRC. The only exception was in Fujian, within the academic community, as it was here where 
Shi Lang was born and raised. Here, most of the research on Shi Lang appeared in university 
journals, in Fujian, and it focused on the admiral’s social background and military talents. This 
type of narrative persisted well into the 1990s. On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, however, a 
strong wave of negative assessments impugned Shi Lang’s reputation, thereby mirroring the 
contestation between the two Chinas. The exiled Kuomintang government, in Taiwan, saw Shi 
Lang as a convenient scapegoat who defected from the Zhengs (and the pro-Ming resistance 
against the Manchu) to serve the Qing. In contrast, the revolutionaries transformed Zheng 
Chenggong from a “symbol of loyalty to a fallen dynasty to one of national self-
determination.”39 According to the Nationalists, like the Communists, the Qing and the Manchus 
had destroyed authentic Chinese culture.
40
 Therefore, the primary task of the Kuomintang 
government was to eradicate Qing influence. And as Shi Lang was seen as a symbolic 
embodiment of the Qing and the mainland, he became the subject of criticism and his 
achievements were downplayed. On most occasions, he was tainted as hangjian, zougou, minzu 
zuiren, and/or erchen, all of which are derogatory terms that were used to describe a traitor. Shi 
Lang was badly demeaned due to the discomforting associations that linked him to the 
“barbarian” Qing and the PRC.41 By contrast, in this political climate, the Zhengs became known 
as the founders of an independent maritime kingdom. 
 
 
Shi Lang after the Cultural Revolution 
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During the devastating Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), as was the case for most historical 
topics, research on Shi Lang came to a halt. Amid a radical movement to “break from the past,” 
libraries, museums, and archives were ransacked, and many priceless artefacts, texts, and 
documents were destroyed. It was only in the relaxed political climate of the 1990s that academic 
interest in Shi Lang was revived. Over the two decades since the 1990s, academic appraisals of 
Shi Lang’s legacy in mainland China have been aligned with the official narrative that has 
developed during the most recent period of renewed cross-strait tension. This “renewed tension” 
arose at the end of the Cold War, when the balance of power dramatically shifted and completely 
reconfigured cross-strait relations (liang’an guanxi). 
 
 
 Following the ruling principle of his predecessor Chiang Ching-kuo (1910-1988),  Lee 
Teng-hui shelved his plan to seek independence from the mainland and, instead, moved toward 
formulating a new and unique Taiwanese identity that was separate from the PRC.
42
 In YEAR, 
Lee’s successor, Chen Shuibian, continued to support these aspirations. The president even 
initiated increasingly provocative steps to bolster Taiwan’s position in the international 
community and to sever the island’s cultural and historical ties to the mainland.43 Meanwhile, as 
the Lee and Chen administrations were directing Taiwan toward a separate course, the 
government of the PRC sought to ascend to the top of the international order by becoming a 
twentieth-first century superpower, a mission the Chinese Communist Party eagerly seized 
upon.
44
 For the PRC, the recovery of all its lost territories, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan, became preconditions for the restoration of China’s past greatness and its march toward 
a new direction for the future.
45
 
 
 
In political, economic, and cultural respects, the PRC has used instrumentalism to 
strengthen its claims to Taiwan. As a result, most of the historiography of the mainland, during 
this period, conveyed a singular view that reflected this political agenda: “Taiwan is an 
inseparable part of China that belongs to the PRC government.”46 Once again, the PRC used Shi 
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Lang, and his role in the annexation of Taiwan, as a political tool to justify mainland China’s 
control over the island. As the widely recognized historian Fu Yiling (1911-1988) proclaimed: 
 
Like Zheng Chenggong, Shi Lang brought Taiwan back to the mainland out of a 
sense of nationalism (minzu dayi). It was done with the best of intentions and was 
by no means a personal vendetta.
47
 
 
Fu Yiling praised Shi Lang as a patriot who helped foster China-Taiwan integration. Fu even 
stated that Shi’s accomplishment was not the result of a personal vendetta, but rather he saw it as 
a national achievement and, thereby, circumvented the issue of whether Shi had defected from 
the Zheng forces. In fact, PRC scholars, at that time, generally did not question Shi’s loyalty to 
the Zhengs, even when they were basing their assessments of his actions on traditional 
Confucian precepts. Instead, they tended to dismiss Confucian moral obligations as having 
formed the foundation of the cultural landscape of late imperial China, arguing that these 
obligations had limited application in the daily lives of the common people.
48
 Instead, their 
assessments focused on Shi Lang’s military glory and also on his success in persuading the 
Kangxi Emperor to incorporate Taiwan into the empire, following the Qing victory, despite the 
Qing court’s insistence on abandoning the island.49 Mainland scholars, such as Lin Qian and 
Wang Zhengyao, argued that Shi Lang and the Kangxi Emperor played crucial roles in unifying 
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
50
 Yet, as pointed out earlier, the use of Shi Lang to justify the 
state’s supremacy over Taiwan and to strengthen the ties between the two coasts was not an 
entirely new development of the PRC era. Late Qing administrations also paid tribute to Shi 
Lang for having bolstered the process of political consolidation. 
  
 
Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the revival of studies on Shi Lang has opened 
up a broader debate, among mainland academic circles, over who deserves more credit for 
bringing Taiwan back to the motherland: Shi Lang or Cheng Chenggong. The “Shi clan,” from 
the Quanzhou area of Fujian, was probably the first group to initiate the debate, in 2003.
51
 Shi 
Weiqing, the author of the Biography of General Shi Lang (Shi Lang jiangjun zhuan), asserted 
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that his forbear was by no means a defector but an extraordinary general in modern Chinese 
history: 
 
We admire Shi Lang because, first of all, he was so brave in sailing across the dangerous 
ocean at the very advanced age of 63. Even though he might have wanted to avenge the 
death of his family, he was courageous and fearless. Moreover, he was bold enough to 
voice the disputes that his colleagues dared not speak out about and achieved a task that 
others had hesitated to complete. He is, thus, incomparably above and beyond all of his 
contemporaries.
52
 
 
 
In a similar fashion, Wuhan University History Professor Wu Boya expressed her admiration for 
Shi Lang’s achievement in the Qing victory: 
 
The fact that Shi Lang strongly proposed to keep Taiwan and was determined to defend 
the island were striking. His determination contributed substantially to Chinese 
unification, thereby checking any potential foreign invasions. His name and spirit will 
probably remain immortal.
53
 
 
These unabashedly positive appraisals were widely spread throughout mainland academic circles. 
In subsequent years, more scholars spoke in similar tones and published articles and book 
chapters that celebrated Shi Lang’s formidable achievements. For example, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences and the National Qing History Editorial Committee organized a 
series of national conferences and workshops that promoted research on Shi Lang. These two 
academic bodies also sponsored the publication of post-conference volumes that urged scholars 
to move beyond the dated notion of a “Han-centered view” and to reassess the legacy of Shi 
Lang according to the framework of “a united but multi-ethnic nation” that incorporated fifty-
five ethnic groups, such as the Mongols, Uyghur, Tibetans, and Manchus.
54
 Even though the 
PRC government had proclaimed, in the 1950s (after the “ethnic classification project” in 1954), 
that the new China was a “united nation” comprised of distinct ethnic communities, the Manchu 
and the Qing dynasty were being treated unfairly. The Communists saw the era of the Qing 
dynasty as being a period of national humiliation. In examining the Qing, they could not escape 
from their preoccupation with the “century of humiliation” that included the failings of its 
frontier/foreign policy, and the consequences for its economy and its people. Yet, interestingly, 
Shi Lang (as a Manchu officer) was an exception. The Communists praised the admiral because 
he had accomplished “China-Taiwan integration.” His legacy, as such, was treated separately, 
under the framework of the “unification of China and Taiwan.” 
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After the National Academy of Social Sciences adjusted to the new line (xin luxian), in 
terms of re-examining Qing history, according to the above “united but multi-ethnic model,” the 
Communist Party began to break through the “humiliation ideology” and acknowledge the 
Qing’s greatness. The PRC decided to reassert its assessment of the Qing Empire, largely 
because the “New China (xin Zhongguo)” had to justify its control over a series frontier regions, 
including Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Therefore, the Communists maintained that Shi Lang was 
a Qing subject who deserved the appraisal of contributing to both “China-Taiwan integration” 
and fixing the border of Qing China and, by extension, to consolidating the connection between 
the Qing and the PRC. As a consequence, Shi Lang was “doubly credited” and, in turn, his 
legacy led to the so-called Shi Lang fever (Shi Lang re) that spread throughout social media and 
academia. For instance, in 2003, the State Administration of Radio and Television sponsored a 
thirty-seven-episode drama on Shi Lang. The entire production process extended over almost 
three years. On March 23, 2006, the premiere screening was held at the Great Hall of the People, 
in Beijing, and attracted a sizable number of central and local officials. Four days later, the 
drama entitled “The Great General Shi Lang” (Shi Lang da Jiangjun) was publicly aired, during 
primetime, on China Central Television (CCTV).
55
 
 
 
The Shi Lang fever quickly gained the central government’s support. In late 2006, the 
Chinese Communist Party pronounced a historically deterministic standardized narrative that 
depicted the history of Taiwan’s incorporation into the Qing state. In this account, Shi Lang is 
officially praised for returning Taiwan to mainland control.
56
 As such, his contribution was 
effectively and markedly elevated. In commemorating the 337
th
 anniversary of the Qing conquest 
of Taiwan, the Social Science Academy in Xiamen founded a research association entitled “Shi 
Lang yanjiuhui.”57 This Association publishes a journal that contains new research findings and 
analyses, commentaries, and books related to Shi Lang and the Kangxi Emperor. In collaboration 
with members of the “Shi clan,” in Quanzhou, the Association even constructed a giant statue, 
depicting Shi Lang facing seaward from his native coastal village in Jinjiang and holding a 
sword that is pointing toward the ground (see Fig. 1). Building on the Communist framework, 
the popular boom in the topic of Shi Lang is notable and its underlying message is readily 
obvious. As Su Shuangbi, the editor of the Communist Party’s journal, Seeking the Truth 
(Qiushi), has alluded, “Shi Lang maintained a principled insistence that Taiwan always belonged 
to China and refused to tolerate any foreign interference in its affairs … Due to his determination 
to preserve the country’s territorial integrity, Shi Lang deserves the exalted title of national 
hero.”58 The editor even went on to predict the future of Taiwan, saying that “the island cannot 
reverse its eventual absorption at the hands of the mainland government, just like the Ming could 
not resist the Qing in the seventeenth century.”59 And in order to “absorb” Taiwan, the PRC, like 
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the Qing, required a strong navy to sail across the strait. Perhaps this would help explain why, 
from the outset, one of the PRC’s aircraft carriers (see Fig. 2), which was launched in 2011, was 
named “Shi Lang.” 
 
 
Figure 1. Statue of Shi Lang in Jinjiang 
 
 
Figure 2. The PRC’s aircraft carrier Shi Lang 
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The counter narrative in the PRC 
  
 
From 2003, the PRC government has assumed a proactive role in promoting a positive, 
celebrated image of Shi Lang and in popularizing this image as its official line. Nonetheless, 
intellectual circles and online social networks in China do not always concur with the 
government’s aspirations for its reappraisal of this important historical figure. Backlashes to the 
Shi Lang fever have occurred at both academic and popular levels. Within academia, some 
scholars, who were assessing whether Shi Lang was the “architect of unification between the 
Qing and Taiwan,” skilfully countered that the admiral also made statements about Taiwan being 
a remote frontier that lay “beyond the orbit” and outside the Qing. For instance, Deng Kongzhao, 
director of the Taiwan Research Institute of Xiamen University, stressed the need for a more in-
depth analysis of Shi Lang before rushing to deify him as a “national hero.” He pointed out that, 
even after the naval victory of 1683, Shi Lang attempted to sell the island of Taiwan to the 
Dutch.
60
 “After all,” Deng continued, “the Qing Empire was a land-bounded empire with a 
continental mindset, and the official court was unable to fully comprehend the geopolitical value 
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of its maritime frontier and the island of Taiwan.”61 Zhu Shuangyi and Zheng Congming and 
other scholars, in China, urge their readers to not pay too much attention to Shi Lang or to not 
overlook the contribution of the Zheng family in bringing Taiwan back to China.
62
 In other 
words, they believe it is time for the overheated Shi Lang boom to cool down. 
 
 
The renewed Shi Lang fever also caused much discontent at the popular level. After the 
release of The Great General Shi Lang on CCTV, producer Chen Ming was attacked in a barrage 
of criticisms that were posted on several internet forums. He was labelled as disloyal, 
unrighteous, and a “fake Confucian.” The forums harshly criticized Chen for having abandoned 
his objective judgement by wilfully and unreservedly promoting Shi Lang in an attempt to feed 
the Communist Party’s political hunger. Added to this, the descendants of Zheng’s family, who 
still reside in the Minnan region of Fujian, could not be satisfied with the Shi Lang fever. As 
pointed out by Xing Hang, after conducting his field trip in Southern Fujian, the pro-Shi Lang 
narrative “added fuel to the ongoing enmity between the Zhengs and the Shis, [which was] 
already strained to the point that members of the two clans still refuse to inter-marry … As 
Zheng Guangnan [a descendant of the Zhengs] writes to me, he sticks up his nose at the very 
idea that an opportunist and turncoat like Shi Lang could match the moral fibre and patriotic 
spirit of his illustrious ancestors.”63 These voices undoubtedly present a challenge to a more 
unified narrative that aims at conformity and stability. Here, we see a distinctly cultural sphere of 
Southern Fujian (Minnan) that is far removed from Beijing’s hegemonic initiatives. As 
mentioned previously, this is a topic that is worth exploring further. 
 
 
The formation of a distinct Minnanese regional narrative on Shi Lang found itself 
distinctly at odds with Beijing’s pronouncements on the topic of Shi Lang and his role in Chinese 
history, particularly as it relates to Taiwan. The Minnan region is often referred to as the 
southern part of coastal Fujian province. When William Skinner mapped out the four principal 
geographically defined economic systems of the Southeast Chinese coast, the Minnan region was 
labelled as the “Zhang-Quan” economic zone.64 The geography of the Minnan region, similar to 
the rest of Fujian province, is largely made up of mountains and isolated valleys that preserve a 
great diversity of local subcultures that range in indigenous dialects, theatrical traditions, 
architecture, food, and musical traditions.
65
 Since the Tang dynasty, if not earlier, the Minnan 
culture has remained unique and distinct among the surrounding provinces. However, not all 
governing regimes appreciate the beauty of such a unique pattern of development. For example, 
in Mao’s era, the Minnan region was considered to represent one of “separatism,” or an attempt 
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to split from the country and its feudal remnants.
66
 Despite the tension between the central 
government in Beijing and the Minnan region, it is difficult to entirely supress or mould a 
regional culture, especially when the region’s spatial and temporal aspects as they relate to its 
culture have been deeply entrenched over several centuries. These differing spatial and temporal 
factors may have contributed to the inconsistent evaluation of Shi Lang within the PRC, but 
these factors are not the only explanation. The negative assessments of Shi Lang, founded in 
Minnan, are also intertwined with the legacy of Zheng Chenggong. Unlike Shi Lang, Zheng 
Chenggong was not born and raised in Minnan, but rather in Nagasaki, Japan, and only moved to 
Southern Fujian (Quanzhou) when he was eight years old. Yet, the connection between Zheng 
Chenggong and Minnan is no less profound than that between Shi Lang and the region. 
 
 
Between 1661 and 1683, Zheng’s headquarters were located in Xiamen – a key port city 
in Minnan. From there, he intended, first, to resist the Qing empire and, then, to mobilize his 
troops to recapture Taiwan. When the Republicans proclaimed Zheng Chenggong a national hero 
in the struggle for a stronger China, Minnan elevated his stature to one of glory and valour. As a 
consequence, Minnan academia has long been focused on the history and achievements of Zheng. 
For example, in the Republican period, Fu Yiling founded the Association of Zheng Chenggong 
(Zheng Chenggong yanjiu xuehui) in order to popularize a positive image of him. Evidence 
obtained from this association’s work helps our understanding of Fu Yiling’s sentiments toward 
Zheng and why he devalued the importance of Shi Lang, as demonstrated earlier. Later, in the 
1970s, Xiamen University established a research unit on Zheng, naming it, “Xiamen daxue 
Zheng Chenggong lishi diaocha yanjiuzu.” Some may wonder why Fu Yiling, and a majority of 
the Minnanese community, could not celebrate the legacies of both Shi Lang and Zheng 
Chenggong, especially during a time when the PRC government acknowledged both historical 
figures.
67
 Naturally, it is possible for a single province to have several national heroes. However, 
some local communities in Minnan find it difficult to acknowledge both historical figures. This 
is especially so in communities where native Zheng family members still enjoy great respect and 
prestige, particularly in light of the fact that Shi Lang betrayed Zheng Chenggong. Consequently, 
every time the Beijing authority promotes the importance of Shi Lang, the response of the pro-
Zheng Chenggong community is a consciousness that runs counter to the state’s attitude. Among 
the counter narratives that exist in Minnan, one can discern how the formation of a passionate 
regional circle could generate a challenge to a more centralized, official narrative that aims to 
achieve a particular sentiment or understanding on a wider national level. 
 
 
The counter narrative in Taiwan 
 
 
Not surprisingly, the counter narrative was strongest on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, 
where Shi Lang has not received respect since the Kuomintang era. As Taiwanese scholar Cai 
Xianghui commented, in 2002, “Shi Lang pretended to foster Qing-Taiwan integration in the late 
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seventeenth century; in fact he selfishly took every opportunity to maximize his profits in 
Taiwan by expropriating farmland and villages.”68 Lu Jianrong also accused Shi Lang of having 
encroached on the property of native Taiwanese. He also questioned Shi Lang’s loyalty, noting 
that “a person could rate himself highly if he is being faithful and loyal to his master or monarch. 
As such, Shi Lang was making himself a mouse because he betrayed the Zheng kingdom. For 
centuries he has held the mark of a defector, which has significantly lowered his reputation and 
status. All in all, no one will admire a deceitful figure.”69 
 
In Taiwan, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, criticism against Shi Lang 
grew. Yang Qinhua and Xu Xiaowang, to name a few, accused Shi Lang of feigning loyalty to 
the Zhengs, betraying the Ming court and sponging off the Taiwanese people. Similar to the 
counter narratives of the Minnanese, this negativity aligned with the positive rhetoric that had 
been accorded to Zheng Chenggong, wherein his opposition to the Qing had been deemed 
righteous and patriotic. However, not all intellectuals in Taiwan have unreservedly attacked Shi 
Lang. Wang Rongzu, a Taiwanese historian who taught for many years in the U.S., was probably 
the first scholar to reassess Shi Lang in a positive light. In his “Security and Warfare on the 
China Coast,” published in 1983, Wang had this to say about Shi Lang, 
 
“(Shi Lang) proved himself not only a brilliant commander but also a perceptive 
strategist and able administrator. He was truly indispensable for the Taiwan 
campaign, no matter how we minimize the importance of an individual in the 
larger historical event……he was a persistent advocate of the Taiwan campaign. 
His knowledge and confidence in the matter were essential for the campaign to 
materialize. His strong interest in it was not simply to seek personal revenge, even 
though Cheng Ch’eng-kung (Zheng Chenggong) had brutally executed his father 
and brother for his defection to the Manchu authorities. He had a stellar 
understanding of the strategic importance of Taiwan to the security of the 
mainland coast, largely due to his familiarity with the island.”70 
 
Early in the 1990s, Taiwanese historian Zhou Xueyu also called for a more objective assessment 
of Admiral Shi. In a similar vain to Wang, Zhou argued that, despite the fact that Shi had 
defected from the Zhengs to the Qing, compared to his contemporaries, he possessed a more 
developed political vision for keeping Taiwan in Qing hands.
71
 By thus interpreting Shi’s 
motives, these Taiwanese scholars are able to view him as a proficient military general, if not a 
maritime hero and, thereby, offer a relatively unprejudiced historical perspective on him. 
 
 
This counter narrative is also included in reappraisals of Shi Lang at the local level. For 
instance, members of Shi’s clan in Taizhong (Taizhong Shixing zongqinhui) continue to promote 
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his legacy on their association website and in their advertising materials. This association 
maintains a Shi Lang memorial hall, in Taizhong, which preserves many primary materials 
related to him. It also venerates their ancestor through workshops and memorial events.
72
 Also, 
Shi Zhongxiang, a clan association member in Tainan, sponsored the establishment of “the 
General Shi Lang Memorial Museum (Shi Lang Jiangjun jinian guan),” which is located in the 
“General District (jiangjun qu).73 Elegantly decorated and designed (see Fig. 3), this museum 
humanizes and extols Shi as the primary agent of Qing-Taiwan integration and also of 
development in Taiwan; nowhere does it castigate him as a traitor. Here, one should be able to 
see an intriguing connection between the Shi clans from both Taiwan and mainland China. Even 
though the two sides are politically separate, political actors have been unable to disconnect the 
Shi Lang familial ties from the link that continues to bridge the cross-strait divide and the 
association between the “two Chinas.” 
 
 
In 2014, Zhang Tianjian, a committee member of the Fudeye miao (Temple of the Lord 
of the Soil and the Ground), proposed the construction of a shrine, in Tainan, dedicated to Shi 
Lang (Shi Lang miao). In a press interview, Zhang indicated that Shi Lang should be worshipped 
because “without his ‘Taiwan proposal’ (Gongchen Taiwan qiliu shu) to conserve Taiwan, the 
Kangxi Emperor would have abandoned the island and overlooked this piece of precious 
territory.”74 Despite the common stereotype of Shi as an unfaithful officer, Zhang notes that the 
admiral never relinquished his interest in Taiwan. It is perhaps even more noteworthy that the 
proposed site of the Shi Lang temple is just 200 feet away the Zheng Chenggong temple 
(Yanping junwang miao). Zhang Tianjian has not commented on the reason for locating the Shi 
Lang shrine so close to the Koxinga temple, but his choice of location may reflect how the 
reappraisals of Shi Lang have fostered renewed interest in the historical significance of both of 
these remarkable Qing figures. In a sense, Zhang represents a group of people who not only 
recognize Shi Lang’s achievement in “keeping” Taiwan within China, but also are passionate 
about discovering his role in shaping Taiwan’s local and indigenous identity. According to 
Zhang Tianjian, Shi Lang was not only an admiral who represented the Qing in the annexation of 
Taiwan, but he was also a heroic figure who recognized the importance of Taiwan. Shi Lang’s 
“Taiwan Proposal,” followed by his policies on ruling the island, imbued him with a Taiwanese 
identity. In a nutshell, Shi’s renewed status should not be seen as the result of the officially 
sponsored narrative coming out of Beijing or the PRC, instead it is based on a local (Taiwanese) 
identity that is the consequence of the emergence of an alternative community, a clear and more 
localized domain of culture, and a symbolic framework of identification that recognizes Shi 
Lang’s contributions from a different point of view. 
 
Fig. 3. The General Shi Lang Memorial Museum (Shi Lang Jiangjun jinian guan) 
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Conclusion 
  
 
For more than two centuries, some of China’s most prominent officials and literary figures, from 
among its numerous intellectuals, have paid special attention to the legacy of Shi Lang. 
Compared to many other historical figures, Shi Lang remains essential to our understanding of 
the troubled past and murky future outlook of the East Asian region’s cross-strait tensions and 
geopolitics. Although the image of Shi Lang has meant different things to different people, in 
some degree, his historical meaning for one particular community has also communicated itself 
to other communities. Consequently, when we look at the various appraisals of Shi Lang’s story, 
we can see the construction of these historical narratives as “a continually shifting and mutually 
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reinforcing process.”75 The story of Shi Lang has been used in different ways in the Qing, in 
Republican China, and in the China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC) of today; its interpretation was 
shaped to accord with the societal trends of the time. For instance, in the early years of the 
Communist period, Shi Lang came under suspicion as an embodiment of a benighted barbarian 
Qing. However, when the PRC sought to reclaim its lost territory, Shi Lang was recast as a 
national and maritime hero who later unified Taiwan with mainland China. Before retreating to 
Taiwan, the Kuomintang government had, likewise, not paid much attention to Shi Lang. This 
government only used him allegorically to point to the illegitimacy of the PRC’s bids to retake 
the island and also to stand as a reminder of Shi’s treason to the Zheng empire, which was Ming 
China’s legitimate representative. 
  
 
All of this suggests that Shi Lang’s legacy was used as a nationalist narrative. Unlike 
most other well-known cultural historical figures, the story of Shi Lang carries a profound 
political message that points to the complications that endure in the cross-strait region. But his 
legacy is much more than this. Shi was a complex, eventful, and controversial figure. His legacy 
encompasses a range of meanings that scholars and the general public have cultivated in order to 
serve the particular circumstances at hand. Shi Lang is clearly one of China’s most complicated 
historical figures. As such, ongoing endeavours to reinterpret his legacy are not confined to the 
production of national narratives that are shaped to accord with a particular political and/or 
nationalist agenda. That is, vast numbers of people also share in this legacy through their 
engagement in the broader process of cultural production in terms of how they have interpreted 
Shi Lang. 
  
 
Yet, at most stages of the process, state-sponsored perspectives have shaped both the 
academic and public discourses on this important historical figure. Nonetheless, as mentioned at 
the beginning of this paper, the central authorities have not always maintained the upper hand. 
Rather, sometimes they are openly defied by opposing voices, which range from academic 
scholars to internet bloggers. Admittedly, the diversity of opinions has substantially grown over 
the past few decades as the social and political environment has become more open. Yet, there is 
no way of knowing how Shi Lang will be treated, in the future, in response to political 
circumstances as these can rapidly change at any time. It is possible that, as long as the PRC 
government remains bent on transforming the political and economic landscape of the Taiwan 
Strait, Shi’s legacy will continue to be discussed in terms of his influence in the region. Only 
when the territorial disputes between China and Taiwan are ultimately resolved will the Shi Lang 
question become less significant in the nationalist narrative of government officials and party 
leaders. 
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